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We develop a model of education where individuals face educational risk. Successfully 
entering the skilled labor sector depends on individual effort in education and public 
resources, but educational risk still causes (income) inequality. We show that an optimal 
public policy consists of deferred skill-specific tuition fees, lump-sum transfers/taxes, and 
public funding of the educational sector. We argue that improved educational opportunities 
matter more than direct income transfers in a Second-best setting. Contrary to standard 
models of income risk, it is not optimal to use a proportional wage tax, because combining 
skill-specific tuition fees and public education spending provide both insurance and 
redistribution at lower costs. A wage tax is only optimal if skill-specific tuition fees are not 
available. 
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For more than 30 years, rising wage inequality, especially between incomes in
the skilled labor sector versus those in the unskilled one, is observed, see, i.e,
Krugman (1995) or Katz and Autor (1999). This type of inequality is also accom-
panied by income risk. The reason is that employment as skilled worker requires
both successful graduation in the higher education sector and ﬁnding a suitable
job later on. Both is by far not guaranteed, see, e.g., OECD (2007, Indicators A3
and A8). Accordingly, (educational) risk of failure to enter the skilled sector is a
salient feature of human capital investment and distributional inequality interacts
with income risk.
What happens then to those households, who fail and end up as unskilled,
and how can welfare of the unskilled workers be increased in an inequality-averse
society? Different approaches to this problem can be observed: in welfare poli-
cies the main focus is on redistribution via direct income transfers as, e.g., the
earned income tax credits in the USA. An additional strategy is to implement
minimum wages, which are in place, i.e, in the U.K. and in France. A more recent
political agenda is to foster educational opportunities, to decrease drop-out rates
(especially at schools) and to ensure that the major part of the population attends
higher education. This is part of the so-called renewed ‘Lisbon-agenda’ in the EU,
announced in 2005 as strategy for growth and jobs (EU-Council, 2005).
However, in the political debate, there seems to be no consensus on what the
best strategy is and the implementation of the ‘Lisbon educational offensive’ in
the EU member countries is doing poorly according to a EU press release in Oc-
tober 2007 (EU-Commission, 2007). Even more amazing – and to the best of our
knowledge – these topics have been entirely neglected in the economic literature,
although stylized facts strongly indicate that drop-out rates are non-negligible and
that higher education has enormous effects on the labor market perspectives of
households (OECD, 2007, Indicator A8). Consequently, the very important, but
still pending question is: Should the government redistribute ex ante by increasing
educational opportunities or ex post by means of income redistribution?
This paper shows that in a Second-best world, where learning effort cannot
be controlled by the government and collecting tax revenue induces distortions,
1it is more important to increase educational opportunities, measured as the suc-
cess probability to graduate, than to provide ex-post income insurance by direct
transfers from the skilled to the unskilled.
Thereto, it is not optimal to use distortionary wage taxation, if the govern-
ment can apply deferred skill-speciﬁc tuition fees. Educational opportunities are
enhanced by an improved resource endowment in the educational sector – which
simultaneously counteracts tax-induced negative incentive effects in learning ef-
fort. The combination of skill-speciﬁc tuition fees and public funding of the ed-
ucational sector simultaneously allows for redistribution and insurance at lower
costs compared to wage taxation and direct income transfers.
In short, the main intuition is: Collecting revenue in a Second-best world is
costly, but spending the revenue in the educational sector instead of granting in-
come transfers, ceteris paribus, mitigates distortions in learning effort and de-
creases the marginal costs of taxation, whereas both ways of spending decrease
income risks and increase welfare.
The main idea behind the outline of our models rests on (i) that wage inequal-
ity interacts with educational risk and (ii) that learning effort (how time is spent
at school respectively at university) and resource investment in the educational
sector endogenize the risk of failure to enter the skilled sector, opening another
channel for governmental policy.
The accelerating wage inequality since the 1980s is driven by globalization
and increasing international trade (Krugman, 1995) and – to the most part – by
skill-biased technological change (Katz and Autor, 1999). Both are seen as either
putting pressure on low-skilled wages and favoring skilled labor (the “American
way”)orcreatingunemploymentinthelow-skilledsector, iftherearelabormarket
rigidities (the “European way”). Jacobs (2004) supposes the wage differential to
increase even more in the future, due to the growth rate of skilled labor supply
lacking behind the demand for skilled workers – implying that wages can be even
less forecasted than by now.
As future wages can hardly be predicted, when investing in human capital,1
1See, e.g., Carneiro et al. (2003) showing for high-school and college graduates that the over-
whelming part of variance in returns to education cannot be predicted by students at the time of
making their investments.
2wage inequality and educational risk are intertwined. Consequently, educational
risk can be twofold (Levhari and Weiss, 1974; Kodde, 1986, 1988): the most
obvious is the risk to fail graduation, implying that most of the resources invested
might be lost. The other type of risk is the uncertainty about future wages and
employment opportunities.
Analytically, the cases of failed graduation and failed (well-payed) employ-
ment can be described in the very same way as uncertain future wages, if the
probability of failure is exogenous. However, to assume that this probability is
exogenous for individuals is not plausible. Therefore it appears reasonable that
to some degree the probability to graduate and to get a job as skilled worker is
the result of individual choices such as learning effort. Obviously, the effort cho-
sen by individuals will, amongst others, depend on the quality of the educational
system and on public resources spent on education.
Endogenizing learning effort then opens another channel, through which gov-
ernmental intervention both via public spending and tax revenue collection in-
ﬂuences market outcome: On the one hand revenue collection can have negative
effects on learning efforts, increasing the risk of failure in education and with it
income risk. On the other hand, the government gains another insurance device in
increasing the success probability and providing ex ante insurance.
In order to analyze these topics, we apply a two-period model, where the indi-
viduals ﬁrst decide on their learning effort. This decision determines their success
probability in higher education and in entering the skilled sector. Then risk real-
izes and the individuals choose their labor supply either as skilled workers or as
unskilled ones. The benevolent government can use a proportional wage tax and
a combination of tuition fees and skilled-contingent loans in order to ﬁnance both
a general lump-sum transfer and public funding of the education system. Public
educational spending is assumed to increase the success probability, because an
enhanced quality in the educational sector, e.g., an increased number of teachers
at university, improves the learning technology.
The proceeding is as follows. The next section contains a short overview on
related literature. In section 3, we present the model, and examine household
behavior in the fourth section. Section 5 then establishes the First-best alloca-
tion as benchmark case, whilst section 6 introduces public policy and section 7
3determines the optimal tax and education policy. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper builds on and extends a large literature on optimal tax policy in case of
risky human capital investment and wage uncertainty.
It is well known from the work by Eaton and Rosen (1980a,b) as well as from
an extended model by Hamilton (1987) that it is optimal to implement a distort-
ing wage tax, because the insurance provided will outweigh the excess burden,
if wage income is subject to (idiosyncratic) risk. A similar result is derived in
Kanbur (1980), where households have to decide, whether to work in a risky en-
trepreneur sector or to earn deterministic wage income as employee. There are no
redistributive motives, because labor market equilibrium implies that the expected
utilities of all households are equalized, but differentiated taxation provides insur-
ance. The result is extended by Boadway et al. (1991) to an optimal linear income
tax scheme.
More recent papers, dealing with risky human capital formation and risky
skilled labor income, are, e.g., García-Peñalosa and Wälde (2000), Wigger and
von Weizsäcker (2001), and Jacobs and van Wijnbergen (2007). Basically, all
these contributions show that a graduate tax, accompanied by some direct edu-
cation subsidies, is optimal in order to insure individuals against income risks.
Anderberg and Andersson (2003) show that education itself can have an insur-
ance effect and should in this case be overprovided, because this also increases
tax revenue.
Common to all these papers is that they treat the risk as exogenous. There is
no choice on learning effort, and therefore no effect of taxation on the probability
distribution itself.2
MostlyrelatedtoourmodelingapproachistheworkbyAnderssonandKonrad
(2003a,b), who also examine endogenous learning effort in a risky setting. They
focus on possible private insurance instead of governmental instruments (Anders-
2The exception is Wigger and von Weizsäcker (2001), who brieﬂy examine the case of ex-ante
moral hazard. However, they restrict to two possible effort levels, and the government cannot
inﬂuence the learning technology by public educational spending.
4son and Konrad, 2003a) as well as on hold-up problems and time-consistent taxa-
tionincaseofaLeviathangovernment(AnderssonandKonrad,2003b). However,
in contrast to our analysis they do not consider direct public spending in the edu-
cational sector and endogenous labor supply in the working period.3 Hence, they
are not able to deal with the issue of providing ex ante versus ex post insurance
against educational and income risk.
3 The Model
We consider an overlapping generations economy in which individuals of each
generation live for two periods of time and die at the end of the second period. In
the second period each individual gives birth to one child so that the population
remains constant over time; each cohort is normalized to one adding up to a total
population of two. In each period individuals are endowed with one divisible unit
of time. At the beginning of the ﬁrst period individuals invest into higher educa-
tion and start working in the second period.4 Following Glomm and Ravikumar
(1992), we assume that both education in the ﬁrst period and working in the sec-
ond period are time consuming activities which generate disutility. When entering
the higher education system, let us name this universities for the rest of the paper,
individuals have to decide on their time effort e ∈ [0,1] devoted to learning, and
consume the remaining time endowment, 1 − e, as ﬁrst-period leisure. At the be-
ginning of the second period individuals decide on their individual labor supply.
However, while entering the university neither a successful graduation nor an
employment in the skilled labor sector afterwards is guaranteed. The probability
p to pass the educational process and to acquire an employment as skilled worker
successfully, positively depends on the effort invested into education e, as higher
educated people easier get higher paid jobs. Beside individual effort, the success
probability also depends positively on the quality of the universities, being mea-
sured in this paper by public funding E of the educational sector. In fact, public
spending ﬁnances the overwhelming part of expenditure on educational institu-
3In fact, the mobility of skilled households can be seen as (an extreme) form of skilled labor
supply elasticity in their papers, but still the unskilled cannot react to, e.g., tax rate changes.
4Implicitly, we assume that individuals already attended compulsory schooling.
5tions, accounting in 2004 for 75.7% respectively for 84.0% of overall expenditure
in tertiary education on OECD average respectively on EU19 average.5
Therefore, we assume the probability function to be a concave function of
both learning effort e and public funding E, having both positive, but diminishing
marginal productivities.6 Moreover, we assume that an increase in public funding
(and consequently in the quality of the university) also increases the marginal
productivity of each time unit invested.7
Accordingly, our human capital production function is given as probability
function for entering the skilled sector
p = p(e,E) ∈ [0,1), (1)
where no private effort at all, e = 0, leads to remaining unskilled with certainty,
consequently p(0,E) = 0. A successful graduation alters the qualitative nature
of labor from unskilled to skilled labor. Each skilled worker is supplied with one
unit of human capital.8
Formally recapitulating the discussion above, we assume the probability func-
tion in equation (1) to have the following properties:
Assumption 1. The probability function for entering successfully the skilled sec-
5See OECD (2007), Indicator B3 and Table B3.2b.
6It might appear odd not to include private resource investment in the educational sector as
determinant of the probability function into the model, because it accounts on average for 15 to
25 per cent of overall expenditure. However, including it makes the analysis very complicated
on a technical level, whereas the main results should not change qualitatively as long as there
is no perfect crowding-out in private and public investment. Therefore, we neglect these private
spending, though this is a hard assumption.
7This assumption might be seen as analogon to complementarity between ability and edu-
cational investment, the latter being used, e.g, in Maldonado (2008) and Jacobs and Bovenberg
(2008), which both generalize the Siamese-Twins-model by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005).
8 The assumption that a successful graduation provides each individual with one unit of human
capital is made to simplify the model and to concentrate on the educational risk. A different formu-
lation of the human capital production function includes learning effort, e, and public resources,
E as arguments: h = h(e,E) with hi > 0, hii < 0, i = e,E.
6tor has the following properties:
∂p
∂e
= pe > 0,
∂2p
∂e2 = pee < 0,
∂p
∂E
= pE > 0,
∂2p
∂E2 = pEE < 0,
∂2p
∂e∂E
= peE > 0,
The probability function in equation (1) mirrors some stylized facts and cap-
tures both the risk of failing in graduation from universities and the risk of getting
no employment respectively only a low-paid job after graduation. The former
risk ﬁts into the category “input risk,” as deﬁned by Levhari and Weiss (1974),
whereas the latter one mirrors “output risk” in their terminology. Both kinds of
educational risk are highly of relevance: First, drop-out rates in, i.e., tertiary edu-
cation are, in 2005, on average around 30% (both in the OECD and the EU19), but
range from 9% in Japan and 17% in Ireland to 46% in the US (OECD, 2007, pp.
63 and Table A3.6). Second, focusing on unemployment risk, this is with about
6% on OECD-average respectively 7% within the EU19 signiﬁcant and even for
graduates in tertiary education not negligible at 4% (OECD, 2007, Tables A8.2a
and A8.4a).
However, though investments in education cause risks, e.g. due to failure as
discussed above or due to, i.e, technological change affecting the utilization of
(speciﬁc) human capital as another source of output risk (Wildasin, 2000), learn-
ing effort and the quality of education have a mitigating effect on the magnitude
of these risks, effecting the success probability directly. As a matter of fact, the
drop-out risk is decreasing in learning effort. Higher educational attainment and a
higher quality of education moreover have a tremendous effect on the output risk.
The OECD (2007, pp.128) regards upper-secondary education as the minimum
level in order to be competitive in the labor market and to obtain a satisfactory
position. In fact, employment rates increase sharply in educational attainment,
whereas in the last 15 years the unemployment risk of workers, who never tried to
reach or failed in upper-secondary education, has been on average twice as large
as for workers with a degree on the upper-secondary level and even triple as large
as for graduates in tertiary education (OECD, 2007, Tables A8.2a to A8.4a). Dif-
7ferentiating for the level of educational attainment, these ﬁgures are also mirrored
in unemployment rates of young non-students, which are then a good indicator of
how higher education affects economic opportunities (OECD, 2007, pp. 331 and
Table C4.3). Especially tertiary education provides a premium, here.
Based on these stylized facts, we will interpret the success probability as
equivalent to educational opportunities, and, accordingly increasing educational
opportunities therefore means increasing the success probability.
Comparing the modeling of (educational) risk in equation (1) and Assump-
tion 1 to the modeling in most of the papers on (income) risk and publicly pro-
vided social insurance (i.e., Eaton and Rosen (1980b), Hamilton (1987), Ander-
berg and Andersson (2003)), which build on the seminal model by Levhari and
Weiss (1974), there are some important differences. In Levhari-Weiss-type mod-
els risk is driven by an exogenous stochastic factor, whose effect on incomes is
either enforced or mitigated by the level of education, a household acquires. Thus,
ﬁrst, the risk itself is exogenous, and the households can use either under- or over-
investment in education only as self-insurance device. Second, the government
can provide social insurance by taxation, and it can grant subsidies to education in
order to affect the self-insurance by the households – either by implementing in-
direct subsidies via capital taxation (Hamilton, 1987) or via direct control (being
equal to direct subsidies) of education (Anderberg and Andersson, 2003). How-
ever, the government can, by its spending, neither affect the risk itself, nor do
education subsidies have a (stand-alone) insurance effect.
In our model, following, e.g., Andersson and Konrad (2003b), the emergence
of risk is determined endogenously by educational investment into learning ef-
fort. Hence, society rationally produces its risk. We think that in our context
this modeling is reasonable as it mirrors better the stylized facts, discussed above.
Moreover, we extend the analysis to allow for quality and funding of universities,
determining the level of educational opportunities. Via this channel, the govern-
ment can now affect directly the magnitude of risk in the economy by varying
its public funding. Consequently, the government gains an additional insurance
device. Note, that this would even be the case, if we allow for private resource
investment, as long as public and private funding are not perfect substitutes.
At the beginning of the second period, those individuals who successfully
8passed the graduation and application process start working as skilled workers,
while those who fail enter the labor market as unskilled workers. Assuming com-
petitive labor markets, we are not able to deal directly with unemployment risk,
being discussed in the stylized facts. However, an increasing wage gap between
skilled and unskilled workers in perfect labor markets and increasing unemploy-
ment among unskilled ones in labor markets with some rigidities are driven by
the same fundamental economic factors (i.e., Krugman (1995), Katz and Autor
(1999)). Thus, our model applying a skill premium in wages in competitive mar-
kets can be seen as suitable approximation.
In the second period households are endowed with one divisible unit of time,
which is divided between second-period leisure and labor supply.9 Total wage
income is spent on total family consumption.
Following the major line of the literature, we assume that private insurance
against educational risk is not available. This might be because of market failure
due to moral hazard (Eaton and Rosen, 1980b), to adverse selection or to the fact
that individuals are too young to write insurance contracts, when they decide on
their human capital investment (Sinn, 1996).10
All individuals have identical preferences which are deﬁned over leisure in
period one and two, l1 and l2, and over total family consumption C in period two.
Thereby, family consumption includes (good) consumption by the child. For-
mally, the preferences are described by a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility function which is additively separable in its intertemporal components.
Thus, we have
E[U] = U1(1−e)+p(e,E)·U2(CH,1−H)+[1−p(e,E)]·U2(CL,1−L), (2)
where H = 1 − l2H denotes labor supplied by a skilled worker in the second
9Because individuals decide about their working time in the second period, a different formu-
lation for the human capital production function will not change our qualitative results. This is
because the amount of human capital, an individual possesses, differs from the amount offered on
the labor market. Including a human capital production function as described in footnote 8 just
means that we have two sources to inﬂuence the supplied amount of human capital which work in
the same direction.
10See, e.g., Andersson and Konrad (2003a) for an opposing view and some discussion of this
assumption.
9period, and L = 1 − l2L denotes labor supplied by an unskilled worker in the
second period.11 In order to ensure an interior solution, especially for the learning
effort e = 1 − l1, we assume that the utility function meets the following Inada
conditions:





























= 0 i = 1,2.
Wages for both skill groups are exogenously given and denoted by wH and
wL respectively and the skill premium in wages equals wH − wL > 0.12 The
government uses a linear (indirectly progressive) income tax scheme consisting
of a tax rate t and a lump-sum transfer T. Moreover, higher education is subject
to tuition fees.13 Hereby, the ﬁction is that these fees are due at entering the
education sector, but are pre-ﬁnanced by the government via a compulsory public
credit. Thus, there are no real payments in the ﬁrst period of life. In the second
period, the repayment is settled in terms of a contingent loan, whereby we assume
in this model that only households, which successfully entered the skilled sector,
are liable to repay a ﬁxed amount fB, being independent of income.
Labeling our loan system is a bit difﬁcult, because, in the literature concerning
graduate taxation and income-contingent loans, there are various deﬁnitions and
some confusion to be found. According to Jacobs (2002, Section 2), these gov-
ernmental instruments can be distinguished as follows: Income-contingent loans
have to be repaid by graduates, when they start to work and if their income ex-
ceeds a kick-in level. The repayment is a fraction of earned income, but the sum
of all repayments is determined by the loan received (plus risk-adjusted interest).
A graduate tax is very similar, but the repayments are not earmarked to the initial
11Subscripts H and L denote the respective values for the different skill groups.
12Assuming exogenous wages can, i.e., be justiﬁed by focusing on a small open economy with
two sectors.
13Note that we do not require the tuition fees to match public expenses for higher education.
Instead, the government can, e.g., use a mix of instruments to ﬁnance higher education or can
spend tuition fees partly outside the education sector.
10subsidyreceived. Infact, agraduatetaxisaprogressivelabortax, whichgraduates
have to pay until they retire.
Our loan repayment fB is, instead, like a public credit contract, where the re-
payment is conditioned on successful graduation into the skilled sector. Hence,
our loan system is rather skill-contingent than income contingent. However, the
skill-contingency turns into an income-contingent loan, if one (i) neglects annual
repayments to be proportional to earned income (which is justiﬁable in a two
period model) and (ii) assumes that in our model only households which success-
fully graduated and work as skilled workers have an income above the kick-in
threshold, high enough to repay the loan fB.
In the following we will use the term ‘skill-speciﬁc tuition fees’ as short-cut
for the combination of tuition fees and their deferred payment via skill-contingent
loans. The alternative wording ‘graduate (income) tax’ – which seems to be very
appealing at ﬁrst glance – might be misleading, because the payment fB does not
depend on skilled income, but only on the fact that one is employed in the skilled
sector.
As earning income, payment of taxes, and the payment of skill-speciﬁc tuition
fees take place within the same period, we assume that these fees can be deducted
as income-related expenses against taxable income.14 The budget constraint of a
skilled household can then be written as
CH = (1 − t) · [wH · H − fB] + T, (3)
whereas consumption of an unskilled household is given by
CL = (1 − t) · wL · L + T. (4)
The educational risk is assumed to be idiosyncratic, hence, there are ex-post
p(e,E) skilled workers and 1 − p(e,E) unskilled ones in each generation. The
14Deducting tuition fees as expenses appears to be odd at ﬁrst glance, because mostly they
cannot. However, the reason for the latter is that, usually, tuition fees are paid in a period, where
students do not earn taxable income, and bringing forward these expenses is not allowed in most
tax codes, see, e.g., the German EStG. Moreover, our assumption is not crucial, because it is
straightforward to show that neither the analysis nor any result will change in our model, if tuition
fees are not tax-deductable.
11governmentusesitsinstrumentsinordertomaximizetheutilityofarepresentative
steady-state generation. Consequently, the government faces a trade-off between
efﬁcient ﬁnancing of public expenditure and optimal redistribution between suc-
cessful and unsuccessful students as well as optimal insurance against the risk of
education.
Inanutshell, thetimingstructureandthemodelcanbesummarizedasfollows:
First, the benevolent government decides on public funding of the educational
sector and on the tax instruments.15 Second, the young generation will choose
the learning effort given the wages and the governmental decisions. This in turn
determines the success probability p(e,E), and with it the fraction of skilled and
unskilled workers. At the beginning of the second period each individual knows
whether it graduated into the skilled sector or failed and will then decide on its
labor supply. In the following, we will solve the model by backward induction.
4 Household Behavior
The complete decision problem of a representative household can be described by
the following maximization problem:
max
{e,H,CH,L,CL}
E[U] = U1(1 − e) + p(e,E) · U2(CH,1 − H)
+ [1 − p(e,E)] · U2(CL,1 − L) s.t. (3) and (4) (5)




= U2C(CH,1 − H) · (1 − t)wH − U2l2(CH,1 − H) = 0, (6)
∂E[U]
∂L
= U2C(CL,1 − L) · (1 − t)wL − U2l2(CL,1 − L) = 0, (7)
∂E[U]
∂e
= −U1l1(1 − e) + pe · [U2(CH,1 − H) − U2(CL,1 − L)] = 0. (8)
15We thereby assume that the government can credibly commit to its chosen tax instruments,
and we do not consider any hold-up and time-consistency problem. Moreover, we do not focus on
extortionary Leviathan governments. See, i.e., Andersson and Konrad (2003b) for these issues in
a related context.
12The system of ﬁrst order conditions (6) to (8) is block recursive such that op-
timal labor supply H∗, L∗ and with it optimal consumption C∗
H, C∗
L are sepa-
rately deﬁned by (6) and (7) respective.16 Note that optimal consumption and
labor supply of the respective skill group is conditional on the policy mix used
by the government (t,T) as well as on the respective wage rate wH, wL. Addi-
tionally, skill-speciﬁc tuition fees fB are only relevant for labor supply and con-
sumption of skilled workers. Inserting optimal labor supply and consumption
into the second period utility function gives the indirect utility function for both
types of workers: V H = U2(C∗
H,1 − H
∗), V L = U2(C∗
L,1 − L
∗). Using the re-
spective indirect utility functions V H and V L in (8) results in the optimal effort
e∗ = e(t,T,fB,E,wH,wL). Evaluating ﬁrst period utility at the optimal effort e∗
gives the ﬁrst period indirect utility function V = U1(1−e∗).
Given the properties of the utility functions stated in assumption 2 and the
block recursive form of the ﬁrst order conditions, it is sufﬁcient to check the sec-
ond order conditions of (5) for each separate variable:
∂2E[U]
∂H2
   
H=H∗
= SOC(H)
= U2CC(1 − t)
2w
2







= U2CC(1 − t)
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The inequality in equation (11) is given by decreasing marginal utility of leisure,
and decreasing marginal productivity of learning, and by the fact that a skilled
worker must have higher utility in the second period than an unskilled one,
V H > V L, because else there will be no learning effort at all.
In the next sections we derive the optimal policy mix. For that reason, we need
to derive the comparative statics of the individual choice variables with respect to
16Throughout the paper, asterisks denote optimal values. To simplify the notation, we drop the
functional arguments t,T,fB,wH,wL, when this causes no confusion.
13the different instruments. We start by calculating the comparative statics of the






























U2CC(1 − t)wL − U2Cl2
SOC(L)
< 0,
where we have assumed that leisure is a normal good. Assuming the substitution
effect to dominate, we avoid backward bending labor supply, thus ∂H
∂t , ∂L
∂t < 0.
By the very same analysis we get comparative static results for the learning









with αj = ∂V j
∂C > 0, j = H,L denoting the marginal utility of income. The
inequality in equation (12) stems from the fact that we assume agent monotonicity
(Mirrlees, 1976) to hold. This implies that a skilled worker always commands a
higher income than an unskilled worker, and hence αH < αL. The intuition
is straightforward: any increase in lump-sum income T decreases the learning
intensity e, because an educational degree gets marginally less attractive.




pe · αH · (1 − t)
SOC(e)
< 0, (13)






V H − V L
SOC(e)
> 0. (14)
Learning effort is unambiguously reduced if the skill-speciﬁc tuition fees rise be-
14cause this directly reduces the return to education and creates a negative substi-
tution effect, whilst increased spending in education increases the productivity of
learning, peE > 0, and therefore learning effort.
Contrary to these effects, the effect of an increase in the wage tax t is less clear.
Increasing ceteris paribus the tax burden on skilled wage income, decreases learn-
ing effort, because the returns to schooling decrease. Increasing ceteris paribus
the wage tax for unskilled workers increases the returns to schooling, and in-










If labor supply of skilled workers is not signiﬁcantly higher than labor supply of
unskilled ones, and given the single crossing property, an increase in the tax rate
increases the learning intensity, because αL · wLL∗ > αH · (wHH∗ − fB). The
intuition is twofold: First, our assumptions imply that the taxation of unskilled
outweighs taxation of skilled, and second, a higher tax rate decreases the income
risk of time investment in education by providing an insurance effect via decreas-
ing the variance in after-tax incomes.
Evaluating the expected utility function in (5) at the optimal labor supplies,
H∗,L∗, and the optimal learning effort, e∗, the indirect expected utility function
of the household can be written as
E[V ∗(t,T,fB,E)] = V (t,T,fB,E)+p(e∗,E)·V H(t,T,fB)+[1−p(e∗,E)]·V L(t,T).
(16)
It is important to note that E[V ∗] is a function of the policy mix chosen by the
government. This policy mix is exogenously given for the households. By using
the envelope-theorem we can derive the marginal impact of a policy change on
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5 First-best as Benchmark
Before we analyze the optimal public policy in a Second-best setting, as described
in section 3, we establish the First-best solution as a benchmark. This allows
later on to examine potential shifts in optimal insuring strategies and to answer
the question, in which cases income insurance respectively increased educational
opportunities have more importance.







subject to the resource constraint
E+p(e,E)·CH +[1−p(e,E)]·CL = p(e,E)·wHH+[1−p(e,E)]·wLL. (22)
Note that in a First-best the government not only chooses consumption Cj and
labor supply Zj, Zj,j = H,L, for skilled and unskilled households, but also fully
controls learning effort e and real educational investment E.
16The ﬁrst order conditions are
∂L
∂e






+λ · pe · [(wHH − CH) − (wLL − CL)] = 0,
∂L
∂E
= pE · [V
H − V
L] (24)
+λ · pE ·
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= p(e,E) · (α
H − λ) = 0, (25)
∂L
∂H
= p(e,E) · (λwH − U
H
2l2) = 0, (26)
∂L
∂CL
= [1 − p(e,E)] · (α
L − λ) = 0, (27)
∂L
∂L
= [1 − p(e,E)] · (λwL − U
L
2l2) = 0, (28)
where λ represents the Lagrangian multiplier and, according to section 4, αj
equals marginal utility of income in the respective skill groups j = H,L.
From equations (25) and (27) follows that
α
H = λ = α
L = α, (29)
thus all households have the same marginal utility of income. Combining next











2l2. Skilled households have a higher marginal utility of leisure
in the second period and are therefore assumed to work more than the unskilled,
HFB > LFB.17 This appears reasonable from an efﬁciency point of view, because
the skilled are more productive. These results then suggest on the one hand that
the government provides full income insurance, in sense of equalized marginal
utilities of consumption/income, but on the other hand that the skill premium,
measured in utility, V H −V L turns negative. These are the most important differ-
17Throughout the paper, the superscript FB will characterize the value of a variable in the
First-best solution.
17ences to a laissez-faire economy or to a Second-best solution, and they are driven
by the fact, that the social planer (the government) can control learning effort per-
fectly in a First-best approach. If there is moral hazard in learning, a positive skill
premium in utility is absolutely necessary in order to induce learning effort – else
there would not be any skilled worker in the economy, because p(0,E) = 0.
In the special case of an additively separable second period utility function,
all these results get crystal clear, because then they imply unquestionable CFB
H =
CFB
L = CFB, but HFB > LFB and, consequently, First-best optimal leisure
1 − HFB < 1 − LFB. Therefore, we end up with V H − V L < 0, giving the
unskilled the higher second period (and overall) utility.
Note also that all these conditions are independent of learning effort and the
quality of the educational system, thus they must hold irrespectively of the level
of E.
Given the results for optimal consumption and labor supply in the second pe-
riod, First-bestefﬁcientlearningeffortthenbalancesmarginaldisutilityofforgone
ﬁrst-period leisure (U1l1) and the second-period welfare loss by an increased num-
ber of skilled households (due to V H − V L < 0) on the one hand and tax revenue
gains by an increased number of skilled households on the other hand. Hereby, we
interpret Tj = (wjZj − Cj), Zj,j = H,L, as lump-sum tax payment of a house-
hold of skill group j. As the ﬁrst line in equation (23) is negative and λ = α > 0
as well as pe > 0, the squared bracket in the second line of (23) has to be positive.
Accordingly, a First-best optimum implies TH > TL.
Optimal public spending E on the quality of the educational sector is deter-
minedbyasimilartrade-offbetweenwelfaregains: publicspendingitselfiscostly
and an increased success probability (pE > 0) and therefore an increased number
of skilled households decrease ceteris paribus welfare, because V H − V L < 0.
However, an increase in skilled workers also increases the resources available for
redistribution.
By applying the resource constraint (22) and TH > TL, we can derive
TH > E
FB > TL. (31)




FB · pE ·
V H − V L
α
+ p
FB · pE · [TH − TL], (32)
where pE is the elasticity of the probability function p(e,E) with respect to a
variation of E. EFB is decreasing in the negative skill premium V H − V L, but
increasing in the additional resources available for redistribution TH − TL.18
We conclude:
Proposition 1. In a First-best solution, the government provides in any case full
insurance in income by ensuring equalized marginal utility of income respectively
consumption across skill types. If optimal educational investment is relatively low
(E < pFB · TH), there are direct resource (income) transfers from the skilled to
the unskilled households (TL < 0).
In a nutshell, income insurance is of major importance relative to increas-
ing educational opportunities, measured by an increase in the success probability
p(e,E). In the following sections, we will now characterize Second-best efﬁcient
policies and then compare the results to the First-best benchmark.
6 Public Policy in a Second-best World
The benevolent government again aims to maximize social welfare. Therefore, it
can inﬂuence the quality of the education system by choosing the public spending
in education E, and it can grant a lump-sum transfer T, but it can no longer control
private learning effort directly. Overall expenditure E + T must be ﬁnanced by
deferred tuition fees in terms of skill-contingent loans fB, and by a proportional
wage tax at rate t. We should stress again that the educational risk is idiosyncratic,
and therefore there is no aggregate risk. From the government’s perspective, there
are p(e∗,E) skilled workers supplying p∗·H∗ efﬁciency units of skilled labor and
[1−p(e∗,E)] unskilled workers supplying (1−p∗)·L∗ efﬁciency units of unskilled
18In principle there can be a corner solution EFB = 0, where the government would like to have
a negative resource investment into education, if either the negative utility premium V H − V L is
too large or the positive gain in tax revenue TH −TL is too small. We are going, however, to focus
on inner solutions, where EFB ≥ 0 is optimal.
19labor.
Thus, the governmental budget constraint can be written as
E + T = p
∗ · [twHH
∗ + (1 − t)fB] + (1 − p
∗) · twLL
∗. (33)
Using E, the government can directly inﬂuence the percentage of skilled workers.
Using thetax instruments, itcan redistribute incomebetween skilled andunskilled
households, which affects indirectly the shares of skilled and unskilled workers
via incentives for learning effort. Both skill-speciﬁc tuition fees and the wage
tax t provide another partial insurance against income ﬂuctuations, and therefore
against the educational risk.
We are now able to state some ﬁrst results. Let us assume for a moment that
all expenditure E is ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax T < 0.
Corollary 1. It is not optimal to ﬁnance the education system only by a (uniform)
lump-sum tax T < 0. The introduction of (i) (deferred) skill-speciﬁc tuition fees
or (ii) a wage tax while reducing the lump-sum tax burden such that the spending
level E remains constant is always welfare improving.
Proof. Assume that initially E = −T and t = fB = 0 hold. Next we introduce
either skill-speciﬁc tuition fees fB > 0 or a wage tax t > 0, while simultaneously
reducingthelump-sumtax, suchthatinbothcasestotalspendingremainsconstant
dE = 0. Implicit differentiation of (33) with respect to fB and t yields:
∂T
∂fB










∗ + [1 − p(e
∗,E)] · wLL
∗. (35)
The welfare effect of introducing skill-speciﬁc fees, respectively a wage tax, can
then be derived by taking the derivative of (16) with respect to fB, respectively to
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whereby we have used the Envelope results in equations (17) to (19).
Financing public expenditure partly by skill-speciﬁc tuition fees creates not
only an income effect on learning intensity and on labor supply, but also gives rise
to a substitution effect in learning, because being skilled gets relatively less attrac-
tive. However, around fB = 0, for the ﬁrst euro of skill-speciﬁc fees, the negative
effect of this distortion is overcompensated by the fact that now the skilled work-
ers pay more for their education than unskilled ones, who failed. As risk aversion
and inequality aversion are just two sides of the same coin, society appreciates a
more equal income distribution because of decreasing marginal utility of income.
The latter effect of skill-speciﬁc tuition fees therefore implies a welfare enhancing
redistribution from high income skilled workers to low income unskilled workers.
Introducing a wage tax does not affect the relative wage premium wH/wL,
but still has an ambiguous (income) effect on the learning intensity, and creates
distortions in both skilled and unskilled labor supply. However, the wage tax si-
multaneously reduces the income risk of educational effort on the individual level,
because the gap between skilled and unskilled income is narrowed, and achieves a
welfare enhancing redistribution of incomes from a society’s point of view. Start-
ing at t = 0, the insurance effect (in combination with the redistribution) domi-
nates the induced distortions and overcompensates the negative incentive effects
on labor supply.
Hence, the effect of a positive wage tax can be seen as reproducing or extend-
ing the seminal results of Eaton and Rosen (1980a,b) in our model of educational
risk.
The questions we seek to answer now are: (i) What is the optimal combination
21of wage taxes, lump-sum elements and (deferred) skill-speciﬁc tuition fees in such
an environment? (ii) What determines the optimal values of the tax rate t and the
fee fB? (iii) Does, in a Second-best world, income insurance still matter more
than educational opportunities?
7 Optimal Taxation and Skill-speciﬁc Tuition Fees
The government seeks to maximize social welfare E[V ∗(E,fB,t,T)] by choosing
public spending in education E as well as the ﬁnancing scheme fB, t and T.





∗ + (1 − t)fB]p+t·wLL
∗(1−p) = E+T
(38)
Note that the government takes the optimal choice of households as granted and
anticipates the reaction of households while making its choice of the policy mix.
Forming the Lagrangian, L, and introducing the Lagrange multiplier, λ, ﬁrst order
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22In subsection 7.1, we are ﬁrst going to derive the optimal tax and education
policy, if skill-speciﬁc tuition fees are not available. In subsection 7.2, we then
broaden the analysis to the full set of instruments and show that the importance of
educational opportunities is even more strengthened.
7.1 Optimal Tax Policy Without a Fee-system
We start ﬁrst with the case, where the government has limited information and
cannot implement skill-speciﬁc tuition fees. If so, FOC (39) is to be canceled and
the parameter fB is equal to zero throughout equations (40) to (42).
Then, let us deﬁne the net social marginal value of income, (including the















, j = H,L, (43)
where Zj = H,L for j = H,L. The second summand on the RHS of (43)
represents the loss in tax revenue due to an income-effect induced decrease in
labor supply and the third summand incorporates the revenue effect from taxing
the skill premium, when the households adjusts its learning effort and therefore
its probability of getting employed as a skilled worker.
From equation (43), the expected net social marginal value of income is given
by
¯ b =
p∗ · αH + (1 − p∗) · αL
λ
+ p










+ t · (wH · H
∗ − wL · L




Slightly rearranging FOC (40) and inserting the deﬁnition of ¯ b from equation
(44), it is straightforward to show that for the expected net social marginal value
of income it must be
¯ b = 1. (45)
Next, we deﬁne the insurance characteristic as the negatively normalized co-
variance of net social marginal value of income bj and labor income wj ·Zj, being
23analogous to Feldstein’s distributional characteristic and measuring society’s con-
cern of avoiding risk, hence, the insurance effect:
χ = −
Cov(bj,wj · Zj)
¯ b · (p∗ · wH · H∗ + (1 − p∗) · wL · L∗)
> 0, (46)




p∗ · wH · H∗
p∗ · wH · H∗ + (1 − p∗) · wL · L∗ ·
(1 − t)wH
H∗ · SHH > 0, (47)
LL =
(1 − p∗) · wL · L∗
p∗ · wH · H∗ + (1 − p∗) · wL · L∗ ·
(1 − t)wL
L∗ · SLL > 0, (48)
as weighted compensated elasticities of labor supply with respect to its net wage,
where Sjj > 0 represents the substitution effect in labor supply Zj. The weights
are the share of skilled respectively unskilled labor income in aggregate labor
income.
The compensated elasticity of learning effort with respect to a change in the
expected net wage (1 − t)¯ w is displayed as
e ¯ w =
(1 − t)¯ w
e
· Se ¯ w, (49)
where ¯ w = p∗ · wH + (1 − p∗) · wL.
Applying equations (45) to (49), some covariance rules and the Slutsky-





HH + LL +
p∗(·wH·H∗−wL·L∗)
p∗·wH·H∗+(1−p∗)·wL·L∗ · pe · [e ¯ w − ψ · ηeT]
≥ 0, (50)
where pe > 0 is the elasticity of the probability function p(e,E) concerning a
change in learning effort e, ψ = Cov(wj,Zj)
¯ w·[p∗·H+(1−p∗)·L] > 0, j = H,L, is the coefﬁcient
of correlation of labor supply and wages, being positive as long as labor supply
is not backward-bending, and ηeT =
(1−t)· ¯ w· ¯ Z
e · ∂e
∂T < 0 is the income elasticity of
19See Appendix 9.1 for an explicit derivation of equation (50).
24learning effort with respect to a change in expected net wage income.
As expected, the optimal labor tax rate is increasing in society’s concern for
insurance χ and the only role of taxation is to insure against educational risk,
because the tax rate would be zero, if the insurance characteristics vanishes (χ =
0). Furthermore, the tax rate is decreasing in induced distortions in skilled and
unskilled labor supply, measured by the elasticities HH and LL.
Last, but not least, wage taxation has a negative effect on compensated invest-
ment in learning, as20
e ¯ w − ψ · ηeT > 0. (51)
This effect translates via pe in a change in educational opportunities and,
weighted by the expected skill premium in wages (relative to expected income),
the third summand in the denominator of the RHS in equation (50) then measures
the income- (or revenue-)relevant effect of wage taxation on the learning effort.
The higher these distortions are, the lower the optimal tax rate should be as well.
Turning to optimal resource investment, this can be derived from multiplying





V H − V L
λ
· pE + t
∗ · [wH · H
∗ − wL · L
∗] · [pE + pe · ηeE]

. (52)
Thus, there are three effects, determining optimal resource investment: The
ﬁrst summand in the bracket on the RHS of (52) represents the welfare increase,
net of ﬁnancing costs λ, by an additional household getting into the skilled sec-
tor due to an improved quality of the educational sector. Note that, contrary to
the First-best solution, the skill premium in (indirect) utility, V H − V L, must be
positive, in order to have positive effort investment e > 0 by households.
The second term, t∗·[wH · H∗ − wL · L∗]·pE, measures increased tax revenue
and, accordingly, the self-ﬁnancing effect, because increasing educational invest-
ment will increase the number of skilled tax payers by pE, paying each additional
taxes on the skill premium in wage income.
Finally, the third term, t∗ · [wH · H∗ − wL · L∗] · [pe · ηeE], makes clear that
investing in the quality of the educational sector is another way to foster learning
20See Appendix 9.2 for a proof of the inequality in equation (51).
25effort e (due to the complementarity in ηeE) and to increase educational oppor-
tunities. On the one hand, this increases ceteris paribus the number of skilled
tax payers again, but on the other hand, and being more important, the increased
public spending can mitigate partially distortions in learning effort, caused by im-
plementing a wage tax t∗ > 0.
Summarizing our discussion in this subsection so far, we can conclude:
Proposition 2. If skill-speciﬁc tuition fees are not available (fB = 0), the govern-
ment will implement a positive wage tax rate t∗ > 0, balancing insurance on the
one hand and distortions in labor supply and learning effort on the other hand.
Optimal resource investment in the educational sector E∗ aims to exploit the
skill premia in utility respectively income by increasing educational opportunities
and it mitigates tax-induced distortions in learning effort by an increased quality
in the educational sector.
In order to describe the full tax policy, we have to determine the optimal lump-
sum transfer T ∗. From the governmental budget constraint (33), we have in case
of fB = 0
T
∗ = t
∗ · wL + L
∗ + t
∗ · p
∗ · [wH · H
∗ − wL · L
∗] − E
∗. (53)












∗)(pE + pe ηeE − 1).
(54)
From equation (54), we reason
Proposition 3. If either the elasticity of the success probability with respect to
educational investment pE or its complementary effect via learning effort pe·ηeE
or at least the sum of both effects is elastic, pE+pe·ηeE > 1, more than the entire
tax revenue from the skill premium is invested in the educational sector and there
are no direct transfers from the skilled to the unskilled. Consequently, unskilled
workers are net tax payers.
Proof. First, from the conditions on pE + pe ηeE > 1 in Proposition 3 and equa-
26tion (54) it follows that the maximum lump-sum transfer is T = t∗ wLL∗, thus
all tax payers are maximally entitled to be reimbursed for their payment on un-
skilled labor income. Hence, the entire revenue from taxing the skill premium
wHH∗ − wLL∗ must be spent on E∗. Moreover, there are deductions from this
maximum transfer, which have to be invested into the quality of the educational
sector as well in order to guarantee a balanced budget of the government. This
proves the ﬁrst statement in Proposition 3.
Due to this spending in the educational sector, there is no money left for cash-
transfers from the skilled to the unskilled. In fact, even if the lump sum transfer
T ∗ should be positive, unskilled workers are net tax payers, because their overall
tax payment TPL is equal to
TPL = t











∗)(pE + pe ηeE − 1) > 0,
given the conditions met in Proposition 3. This proves the last statement.
No matter, whether the lump-sum transfer T ∗ remains (somewhat) positive or
turns even into a lump-sum tax, Proposition 3 implies that all households have to
pay for the educational system, at least as long as the success probability is suf-
ﬁciently elastic. Unskilled workers are made better of ex ante by increasing their
educational opportunities due to investing (strongly) into quality of universities
instead of providing income transfers ex post.
Thus, the optimal tax and education policy in case of unavailable skill-speciﬁc
tuition fees can be summarized as decreasing the variance in wage income by
implementing a labor tax and trying to get as many households employed in the
skilled sector as possible – given direct resource costs and excess burden caused
– for providing ex-ante insurance and for increasing the expected utility of each
household.
In the next subsection, we are going to extend the instruments of the govern-
ment for skill-speciﬁc tuition fees and we will show that this fosters the focus on
educational opportunities.
277.2 The Case of Skill-speciﬁc Tuition Fees
Turning to skill-speciﬁc tuition fees, we can solve FOC (39) for p∗ · αH, respec-
tively solve (40) for −(1−p∗)·αL. Substituting both rearranged expressions into
the ﬁrst order condition (41) results in
(wLL∗ − wHH∗ + fB) · λ ·

p∗ + p∗
e · A ·
∂e/∂fB
1 − t




+wLL∗ · λ ·

(−1) + p∗
e · A ·
∂e
∂T
+ p∗ · twH ·
∂H∗
∂T









e · A ·
∂e
∂t
+ p∗ · twH ·
∂H∗
∂t





where A = [twHH∗ + (1 − t)fB − twLL∗]. After collecting terms and simpli-
fying we apply the Slutsky equations for the derivatives of labor supplies H∗ and
L∗. Note that the derivatives of decision variables for the lump-sum transfer T are
pure income effects, and that
∂H∗/∂fB
1−t = −∂H∗






























with Sjj, j = H,L, as substitution effect of labor supply, when its wage changes.















If we then deﬁne HH =
wH
H∗ · SHH as the compensated wage elasticity of
skilled labor supply, and LL =
wL
L∗ · SLL as the compensated wage elasticity of
unskilled labor supply, equation (57) reduces to
t · [wH · p
∗ · H
∗ · HH + wL · (1 − p
∗) · L
∗ · LL] = 0. (59)
Using this result, we derive the following proposition:
28Proposition 4. If the government can use skill-speciﬁc tuition fees fB and if the
government simultaneously has access to an unconstrained lump-sum transfer T,
it is not optimal to use a proportional wage tax, hence t = 0.
Proof. Unconstrained lump-sum transfer implies that this transfer can turn nega-
tive, and can be used in order to ﬁnance public educational spending. In this case,
we can apply the above calculations, and get from (59) directly t = 0, because the
compensated elasticities jj, j = H,L, and the wage bills of skilled and unskilled
worker must be positive, hence the squared bracket in (59) is positive.
Contrary to standard models featuring risky human capital and taxation (e.g.
Eaton and Rosen (1980b), Hamilton (1987), but also Anderberg and Andersson
(2003)), the distortionary wage tax is not used, although it would provide simul-
taneously insurance against income risk, and redistribution of resources to house-
holds with a higher weight in the social welfare function. Compared to subsection
7.1, the reason is that now skill-speciﬁc tuition fees are available, which do not
depend on labor supply. These fees are a superior instrument for redistribution,
although they distort individual learning effort. The latter distortion can then be
countered by public spending in the educational sector.
Making use of t = 0, we can deﬁne the net social marginal value of income















for skilled worker. The expected net social marginal value of income then reads













From these deﬁnitions and FOC (40) follows, accordingly to the previous sec-
29tion, that the expected net social marginal value of income must be
¯ b = 1 (63)
again.

























e as the compensated elasticity of learning




If we moreover rely again on pe and pE =
p∗(e,E)
E · p∗
E > 0 as the elasticities
of the success probability and ηe,E = e
E · ∂e
∂E > 0 as the elasticity of learning effort
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Proposition 5. The optimal ﬁnancing scheme includes skill-speciﬁc tuition fees
fB > 0. Induced distortions in the learning effort are mitigated by a positive
public spending in the educational sector, E > 0.
Proof. As p ∈ [0,1) and bL,pe > 0 by deﬁnition, we have that
sign(fB) = −sign(efB) (67)
30from equation (65). Looking at the results of comparative-statics, we ﬁnd
efB =
∂e






∂T < 0 from (13) respectively (12). Hence, fB > 0.
In case of fB > 0, it follows at once from equation (66) that the optimal public
spending in the education sector must be positive, because all elasticities and the
marginal costs of tax revenue λ are positive, and an interior solution for learning
effort e requires V H > V L.21
Now, redistribution is executed by skill-speciﬁc tuition fees, which have to
be paid by successful workers. The advantage of skill-speciﬁc fees is that they
do not distort labor supply, and that they are very efﬁcient in redistributing from
high income to low income groups. However, they induce a substitution effect in
learning effort, because getting graduated gets less attractive.
This gets very clear by looking at equation (65): The net social marginal value
of income for an unskilled worker in the numerator of the second fraction on
the RHS indicates welfare gains from indirect redistribution (only the skilled are
taxed), whereas the denominator balances these welfare gains against distortions
in learning effort (efB), which translate via the elasticity of the probability func-
tion pe into both a decrease in educational opportunities and in the number of
skilled worker. Additionally, this trade-off is weighted be the relative number of
unskilled to skilled workers.
The inefﬁciency caused by skill-speciﬁc tuition fees can, however, be partly
offset by public funding of the education sector. The more the government spends
on education, the higher will be a) the probability of each household to graduate
into the skilled sector, and b) – ceteris paribus – private learning effort.
As skill-speciﬁc tuition fees reduce the income gap between skilled and un-
skilled worker, and public spending increases the likelihood of getting graduated,
the combination of both instruments also has an insurance effect, because educa-
tional and income risk is reduced.
21Remind that V H ≤ V L cannot appear as long as households choose learning effort, because
this would imply e = 0, and p∗(0,E) = 0, which cannot be socially optimal as long as wH > wL.
31Taken together, efﬁcient redistribution via skill-speciﬁc tuition fees, and the
insurance function of the combined instruments, discussed above, allows the gov-
ernment to abstain from the wage tax. It is indeed a surprising result that the
wage tax is not used in the optimum: Whilst skill-speciﬁc tuition fees have a neg-
ative substitution effect on learning effort and create therefore an excess burden,
wage taxes have distortionary effects on the labor supplies of skilled respectively
unskilled households, but – compared to skill-speciﬁc tuition fees – provide as
well insurance against income risk and have a limited or even offsetting substitu-
tion effect on learning effort.22 Thus, standard intuition from Second-best models
would tell us that one should apply the Lipsey-Lancaster theorem and balance the
overall excess burden by using several distorting instruments. However, this is
not the case in our setting. Here, increased public expenditure on the education
system, E, both reduces efﬁciency costs of tuition fees and provides insurance at
lower costs than a wage tax – as long as learning effort is endogenous and there
is complementarity between private effort and public endowment of the education
system, peE > 0.
However, public expenditure in the education sector does not only depend on
skill-speciﬁc tuition fees:
Corollary 2. Optimal public expenditure for education increases in
(i) the efﬁciency of the learning technology,
(ii) the complementarity of (private) learning effort and public spending.
Moreover, optimal expenditure E and
(a) skill-speciﬁc tuition fees fB,
(b) the skill premium, measured in utility, V H − V L
are (ﬁscal or strategic) complements, whereas public expenditure and marginal
costs of creating tax revenue are (strategic) substitutes.
Proof. The proof to this Corollary follows directly from equation (66). (a), (b),
and the decrease in marginal costs λ are straightforward. The efﬁciency of the
22The latter can be seen from equation (15) and its discussion in section 4.
32learning technology can be measured by the elasticities pe, and pE, whereas the
complementarity of e and E is an increasing function of ηeE. From (66) it follows
that the optimal E∗ increases in all these elasticities, which proofs parts (i) and
(ii).
The intuitions behind these results are as follows: The higher the skill-speciﬁc
tuition fees are, the higher are the distortions in learning effort. This requires
higher public spending for education. In fact, this result is similar to the result
in Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005). In order to avoid major inefﬁciencies, when
redistributing from skilled to unskilled, subsidies are necessary. Whilst in Boven-
berg and Jacobs (2005) direct subsidies are granted, in our model the government
subsidizes education indirectly via improved learning technologies and increased
educational opportunities.
The more effective the learning technology is and the more elastic learning
effort, the more students can be graduated via educational spending – which can
be seen as a kind of redistribution, – and the better each individual can be insured
against educational risk via increased opportunities. Last but not least, the greater
the difference in utilities of skilled and unskilled worker, the higher the welfare
gain, when more workers get into the skilled sector by public spending.
To close the model, we have to determine the optimal lump-sum transfer. For
t = 0, the governmental budget constraint reduces to
E + T = p
∗ · fB. (69)
Substituting for p∗ · fB in equation (66), we end up with
T =
1 − (pE + pe · ηeE)
pE + pe · ηeE
· E − p
∗ · pE ·
V H − V L
λ
. (70)
Obviously, the optimal lump-sum transfer turns out to be a real lump-sum
tax T < 0, unless the success probability is very inelastic, and hence unless the
learning technology is very inefﬁcient.
Proposition 6. Some part of public expenditure is ﬁnanced by a general lump
sum tax, T < 0, if the success probability with respect to public spending pE or
33its complementary effect via learning effort pe · ηeE or at least the sum of both
effects is elastic, pE + pe · ηeE > 1.
Proof. Proposition 6 follows directly from (70), and recognizing that V H > V L.
Analogously to Proposition 3 in the previous section, the educational system
will be ﬁnanced by both the skilled and the unskilled worker, if the learning tech-
nology is not too inefﬁcient. Skill-speciﬁc tuition fees are therefore not used to
redistribute income directly to the unskilled, but are used in order to provide better
chances in the educational system. Thus, even if more information is available to
the government and it can apply skill-speciﬁc tuition fees, educational opportuni-
ties play a major role.
Moreover, the lump-sum tax is increasing – at least in some range – in the
effectivityofpublicspendingpE, becausethesecondtermin(70)tendstoinﬁnity,
if pE → ∞, whereas the ﬁrst term tends to zero, if pE → ∞, and the sum tends
to inﬁnity.
Of course, lump-sum taxation is not very realistic and not very appealing in a
Second-best world. In our model, the lump-sum tax can, fortunately, have another
interpretation as well: −T can be seen as general tuition fee, which has to be paid
irrespectively whether a student is successful in educational investment. Overall
tuition fees are then F = −T +fB, whereby these will only be paid in full by the
skilled. Hence, our model and our results argue in favor of general tuition fees,
which are only partially pre-ﬁnanced and insured by skill-speciﬁc tuition fees.
7.3 Comparison to First-best: Educational Opportunities
Matter
Finally, we want to address the question of direct income insurance versus in-
surance via educational opportunities. We have seen in the First-best analysis
that direct income insurance is always guaranteed by equalized (ex-post) marginal
utilities of income and that resource investment in the educational sector only de-
pends on the skill premium in utility and on resource gains for redistribution by
increasing the number of skilled households. All this changes distinctly, if the
34government has limited instruments available, as it cannot control private learning
effort directly.
In a Second-best setting, any direct income redistribution has negative incen-
tive effects on learning effort and causes moral hazard, as the government cannot
control, ifand how time isspent at university. Incase of endogenous successprob-
abilities and educational opportunities, (wage) taxation gets therefore even more
expensive, because not only labor supply may be distorted. Taken together, these
effects weaken the case for income insurance, which provides the core intuition in
risk-and-insurance papers à la Eaton and Rosen (1980a,b).
At the same time, induced distortions in learning ceteris paribus call for in-
creased public spending on education, in order to dampen the moral hazard effect.
Moreover, comparing the First-best level of learning effort in equation (23) with
the household’s ﬁrst order condition (8), we see that the households neglect the
resource increasing effect on behalf of the government, the last term in equation
(23). Accordingly, there is another reason for underinvestment in effort, which
has to be countered by increased public spending. This need for public spending
would persist even in a setting with private investment into the quality of univer-
sities.
Comparing the First-best efﬁcient level of real investment E in equation
(32) and the Second-best level, determined in equation (66), these two effects
are represented by the second term in the squared bracket on the RHS of (66),
p∗ · fB · pe · ηeE.
Next, the skill premium, measured in utility V H − V L, turns positive in a
Second-best optimum. This ceteris paribus increases educational investment, be-
cause an additional graduate increases social welfare, now. However, the marginal
costsofprovidingE alsoincrease, becausenowλnotonlyreﬂectsmarginalutility
ofincome, butalsoinduceddistortionscosts, whichceterisparibushaveanegative
effect on E. Although the government most likely increases its real investment,
nothing can be said on the success probability p∗, because private learning effort
is likely to decline.
Last, but not least, introducing a general tuition fee (a negative lump-sum
transfer T < 0) decreases income and induces higher learning effort according to
equation (12). The lump-sum tax can therefore be justiﬁed by aiming to increase
35educational opportunities as well.
Collecting all the effects described above, we can state:
Proposition 7. In a Second-best world, increasing educational opportunities
matters (compared to the First-best solution) more than providing income insur-
ance, because providing directly (full) insurance via income transfers (T > 0)
gets (too) expensive, and because public resource investment also corrects for
inefﬁciencies in private learning effort in a relatively cheap manner.
This result is robust, even if the government suffers from stricter informational
restrictions and cannot implement skill-speciﬁc tuition fees via fB. The call for
improving educational opportunities and the preferability over income transfers is
at the heart of Proposition 3 in subsection 7.1 as well.
The absence of wage taxation and part of the shift from income insurance to
increased educational opportunities are, however, sensitive to our focus on edu-
cational risk and the absence of wage risks within one skill group. Introducing
additionally income risks, e.g., in the skilled sector, might lead, in a Second-best
setting, to positive graduate taxation of the Eaton/Rosen-type, which then distorts
labor supply of the skilled. If so, this might give rise for general wage taxation
as well, and for distorted labor supply decisions in the skilled and the unskilled
sector according to the Lipsey-Lancaster-theorem. Nevertheless, educational op-
portunities and public investment into the quality of the educational sector still
play a prominent role in such a setting, and we think that it is worth wile to exam-
ine these extensions in more detail in future research.
8 Conclusions
We examine the effects of endogenous human capital risk, where the probabil-
ity of getting an employment in the skilled sector is endogenously determined by
individuals, and depends therefore also on tax instruments. We apply a model,
where households ﬁrst choose their learning effort and after realization of risk,
they choose their labor supply. We show that a distorting wage tax will not be
used, although it would be optimal, if skill-speciﬁc tuition fees are not available.
Thus, the standard trade-off between distortions in labor supply and insurance
36against income risk does not apply. Skill-speciﬁc tuition fees can achieve redistri-
bution between skilled and unskilled households, and grant some insurance. The
distortions in learning effort, induced by skill-speciﬁc fees, are mitigated by pub-
lic spending in the educational sector. In addition, this public education funding
is another instrument for redistribution.
Taken together, we are able to state that increasing educational opportunities,
measured as success probability in graduation, is preferable to providing income
transfers, as the latter get (too) expensive in a Second-best world. Thus, redistrib-
ution in an ex-ante sense is more important than spending resources for ‘healing’
bad outcomes ex post. This holds even if skill-speciﬁc tuition fees via fB are not
available.
9 Appendix
9.1 Derivation of Equation (50)
From inserting fB = 0 and rearranging FOC (41), we obtain
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j] · E[wjZj] (72)
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because E[bj] = 1 from equation (45).
Adding p∗ t wH
∂H
∂T wHH∗ + (1 − p∗) t wL
∂L
∂T wLL∗ +
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∂e
∂T [p∗ wHH∗ + (1 − p∗) wLL∗] on both sides of (71), we





































where E[wjZj] = [p∗ wHH∗ + (1 − p∗) wLL∗].





























· (− ¯ w), (76)
whereby Sjj > 0 represents the substitution effect with regard to the own wage
and Se ¯ w is the substitution effect of a change in the expected wage ¯ w on learning
effort. Moreover, ¯ Z = E[Zj] = p∗ H∗ + (1 − p∗) L∗ and ¯ w = E[wj] = p∗wH +
(1 − p∗)wL.
When we revert to equations (74) to (76) and cancel income effects in equation
(73), where possible, we are left with
Cov(b
j,wjZj) = p
∗ t wH SHH (−wH) + (1 − p
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Making use of Steiner’s rule again, the parenthesis in the last line of equation
(77) turns into
E[wjZj] − ¯ w ¯ Z = Cov(wj,Zj),
and dividing equation (77) on both sides by expected wage income E[wjZj] =
p∗ wHH∗+(1−p∗) wLL∗, multiplying by minus one, and applying the deﬁnitions
38in equations (46) to (49) as well as
ψ =
Cov(wj,Zj)
¯ w · [p∗ · H + (1 − p∗) · L]
> 0 and ηeT =












HH + LL +
p∗ (wHH∗ − wLL∗)




As the squared bracket on the RHS is positive from equation (51) and all other
terms are positive by deﬁnition, the optimal tax rate t∗ must be positive as well.
This then proves equation (50).
9.2 Derivation of Equation (51)
Inferred from the steps in Appendix 9.1 and equations (78) and (73), it is










By inserting some comparative statics results, (15) and (12), this turns into
e ¯ w − ψ ηeT =
pe ·

















whereby E[wjZj] = p wHH∗ + (1 − p∗) wLL∗.
The inequality in (82) stems thereby from the fact that SOC(e) < 0 from
(11), wHH∗ > wLL∗ due to assuming agent monotonicity, p ∈ [0,1) and
pe,αH,αL > 0. This proves equation (51).
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